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Abstract
While machine learning systems show high suc-
cess rate in many complex tasks, research shows
they can also fail in very unexpected situations.
Rise of machine learning products in safety-
critical industries cause an increase in attention in
evaluating model robustness and estimating fail-
ure probability in machine learning systems. In
this work, we propose a design to train a student
model – a failure predictor – to predict the main
model’s error for input instances based on their
saliency map. We implement and review the pre-
liminary results of our failure predictor model on
an autonomous vehicle steering control system as
an example of safety-critical applications.
1. Introduction
How can we evaluate machine learning systems for safety
critical domains such as autonomous driving? While ma-
chine learning systems show high success rates in many
complex tasks such as speech recognition and image cap-
tioning, research shows they can also fail in unexpected
situations (Goodfellow et al., 2014) and even cause fatality
in critical applications (Kohli & Chadha, 2019). The goal
of this project is to predict model failure in safety-critical
applications, such as automated vehicles, where failure costs
are extremely high compared to other commercial machine
learning products, like targeted advertisement algorithms.
Another motivation of this research is to further improve
machine learning products for real-world applications. An
important example of industrial level requirement for ma-
chine learning products is providing fail-safe conditions
in functional safety standards like ISO26262 in the auto
industry.
Recently, there has been increasing attention in evaluating
model robustness and failure estimation in machine learning
research (Kendall & Gal, 2017). Although model robust-
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ness has multiple and different definitions in the literature,
it boils down to validating non-uniform model behavior.
Researchers study the roots of model behavior in different
topics such as adversarial attacks, architecture and train-
ing process inefficiency, and training data incompleteness.
New model architectures like Bayesian Deep Learning (Gal,
2016) opened new doors to perform failure estimation via
epistemic uncertainty analysis (Uesato et al., 2018), but with
the growing popularity of pre-trained machine learning mod-
els and APIs with possibly biased or insufficient training
data, it is important to analyze the model for blind spots.
In this paper, we propose a new design to train a failure
predictor student model for predicting the main model’s
error for every input instance. We implement and evaluate
our method on a common machine learning solution in
self-driving car applications as an important safety-critical
domain. We use PilotNet (Bojarski et al., 2016b), as a
case study, which is a driving model to control the steering
wheel. We then train a failure predictor model using saliency
maps from the main model to predict the steering wheel
angle error. We evaluate our failure predictor model based
on prediction error and the driving safety gained by this
system.
2. Background
Here we briefly review two main directions for identifying
model failure types including predicting failure instances
and improving model resilience.
Exploring model blind spots due to random biases in the
training data is an active line of research that is studying
model robustness. For example, in reinforcement learning
architectures, Uesato et al. (Uesato et al., 2018) propose an
adversarial approach to search for scenarios where an agent
could fail. Similarly, to find the non-uniform error behavior
of the system in image captioning tasks, Nushi et al. (Nushi
et al., 2018) propose a clustering method to observe and
model the failure conditions with decision trees. Others
also investigated different search algorithms (e.g., (Bansal
& Weld, 2018; Lakkaraju et al., 2017)) and crowdsourcing
approaches (e.g., (Attenberg et al., 2015)) to identify model
failures assuming there is no access to the training data.
Furthermore, recent machine learning evaluations show how
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Figure 1. Overview of our method to train the failure predictor model.
a model’s over reliance on context could also cause un-
intended context dependencies which may result in the
model hallucination of objects that are not present in the
image (Shetty et al., 2018). In another paper, Rosenfeld et
al. (Rosenfeld et al., 2018) studied objects location depen-
dency in image recognition models.
Adversarial examples are another class of artifacts that ques-
tion model robustness by causing machine learning mod-
els to misclassify inputs with high confidence (Goodfellow
et al., 2014). Since new attack techniques are being de-
signed by the machine learning community, new defense
mechanisms have been also invented to increase model ro-
bustness (Biggio & Roli, 2018). Related to our work, Pa-
pernot et al. (Papernot et al., 2016) show model distillation
can improve model robustness against adversarial attacks.
They define their robustness metric and, in a set of evalu-
ation experiments, show how the distilled student model
is more robust to adversary attacks. Recently, Fong and
Vedaldi (Fong & Vedaldi, 2017) show the application of
salient maps in detecting adversarial attacks. They train an
AlexNet model to distinguish between clean and adversarial
images (using a one-step iterative method from (Kurakin
et al., 2016)) and achieved high accuracy. Similarly, Zhang
et al. (Zhang et al., 2018) designed an adversarial example
detector by concatenating input images with the saliency
maps to train a binary adversary detector. However, rigorous
evaluations of defense methods (Carlini & Wagner, 2017)
demonstrate certain limitations of current defenses when
dealing with complex attacks.
Our work differs with the current machine learning research
as we focus on the model’s error (or failure) probability
estimation in which a student model is trained by a weak
teacher. To further digest and pass the useful learning rep-
resentations from the teacher to the student model (failure
predictor model), we create a saliency map training set for
the student model.
3. Methodology
We propose a transfer learning approach in which we train
a failure predictor model to predict the main model’s er-
ror at each prediction. We follow (Papernot et al., 2016)
to transfer knowledge from the initial model to a student
model with the same architecture. Similar to the approach
in (Fong & Vedaldi, 2017), we create a saliency training
set to train the failure predictor model. The saliency maps
are generated from the main model and we utilize the Visu-
alBackProp (Bojarski et al., 2016a) technique to generate
saliency maps. The choice of VisualBackProp technique is
because of the fact that this technique is originally designed
and tested for the PilotNet model and images including
roads and vehicles. The training labels for the failure predic-
tion model are the steering wheel angle (SWA) prediction
errors of the initial model for each frame.
New Target = PilotNet (SWA Prediction) - Baseline (SWA)
Figure 1 shows an overview of our pipeline for training
the failure predictor model along with the initial model.
Since a highly accurate teacher model cannot transfer its
weaknesses and blind spots to the failure predictor model,
similar to Uesato et al. (Uesato et al., 2018), we use the
same architecture but a weakly trained teacher model to
create our saliency map training set. In our implementation
and experiments, we also had to transfer the convolutional
layers from the teacher model to the student model to start
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Figure 2. Trained PilotNet model performance across driving con-
ditions. The performance graph suggests the model prediction
error increases with the road’s degree of curvature.
the training. This may be due to the less informative nature
of saliency maps compared to the original images.
4. Implementation
In this section, we review the implementation details of our
failure prediction technique on the PilotNet algorithm as an
example of a steering wheel angle prediction algorithm.
4.1. PilotNet Model
We borrow the PilotNet architecture form from Bojarski
et. al (Bojarski et al., 2016b) as a simple network for a
SWA prediction. PilotNet includes five convolutional layers
followed by three fully connected layers and no softmax
layer. PilotNet’s output is the prediction SWA which is
the inverse turning radius. Our training data was limited to
54,000 samples from one front camera and no other driv-
ing or navigation related data. Input camera images were
converted to grayscale, cropped to the top-half of the image,
and resized to 102 by 364 pixels. We have not used any
other pre-processing or data augmentation techniques in this
implementation. We used drop-out layers for the fully con-
nected layers and Adam optimizer (Kingma & Ba, 2014) for
the model training. Figure 2 shows the Mean Absolute Error
(MAE) of our trained model for ranges of SWA. These SWA
prediction results show PilotNet has a weak performance in
predicting SWA at intersections and sharp turns. This may
be due to the fact that no navigation data is used in PilotNet
training.
4.2. Saliency Map
In order to generate the saliency maps, we use VisualBack-
Prop technique from Bojarski et.al (Bojarski et al., 2016a).
VisualBackProp layer-wise relevance propagation technique
involves a series of deconvolution and point-wise multipli-
cation of averaged feature maps in each layer to upscale the
Figure 3. An example of saliency maps of the input images. Top:
Input camera image Bottom: Generated saliency map using Visu-
alBackProp (Bojarski et al., 2016a) technique.
previous layer. Figure 3 shows an example of a saliency map
of the input camera image using VisualBackProp technique.
We then generate saliency maps for each frame to create a
saliency map training set to train the failure predictor model.
To optimize our saliency training set for maximum of failure
cases but limited to the dataset distribution, we use a weakly
trained main model to create the saliency maps. We also
calculate the SWA error and save as the training target for
the failure predictor model. This is done through testing
the trained PilotNet model and calculating the difference be-
tween the predicted SWA and baseline SWA for each input
image.
4.3. Failure Predictor Model
We choose the the same network architecture as PilotNet
model for our failure predictor model due to their task simi-
larities. However, it is trained with the saliency maps train-
ing set instead of camera images. The saliency map inputs
are in grayscale with the same size as the camera images.
Also, different from the main model, the training target for
the failure predictor model is the SWA prediction error of
the main model at each frame. We also transfer pre-trained
convolution layers from the main model to start the training
of our failure predictor model. This improves the training of
the failure predictor model by picking the training up from
the main model. We optimized the failure predictor model
in 30 epochs with batch size of 128 using Adam optimizer
and learning rate of 1e-5. We review the performance of
this model in the next section.
5. Evaluation
We use two evaluation methods to measure our method’s
performance in predicting model failure. We first calculate
and report the failure predictor model’s MAE and then com-
pare our results with Hecker et al. (Hecker et al., 2018) in
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Figure 4. Comparison of the failure Prediction Model performance
when trained with saliency maps versus camera input images.
Similar trend observed in higher SWA ranges.
terms of increasing driving safety in a human-machine col-
laborative driving experience. We also compare the failure
predictor model performance when trained with saliency
maps versus camera images.
5.1. Evaluating Failure Prediction
We first evaluate the performance of our failure prediction
model using the MAE of predicting the main model’s (Pilot-
Net) error. The predictor model’s MAE is the mean absolute
deviation of each frame’s “predicted error” from “baseline
error”. Figure 4 presents the MAE of the failure predictor
model across different ranges of SWA. Similar to the obser-
vation of PilotNet’s accuracy (see figure 2), failure predictor
model also performs better in slight turns and curves such as
on highways. We also present a comparison between error
prediction performance when the student model is trained
with image inputs versus saliency maps. This comparison
indicates that saliency inputs have enough information to
perform a better failure prediction.
5.2. Evaluating Safety Gain
In our second evaluation, we choose an error threshold as
the unsafe condition to be predicted by the failure prediction
model. In this evaluation case, the failure prediction model
serves as a safety mechanism to reduce the risk of collisions
by alerting the driver to take over. Similar to (Hecker et al.,
2018), we define five degrees as the SWA prediction error
threshold for the unsafe conditions. We then calculate the
true positive rate in predicting failure instances based on
this threshold.
The true positive rate shows the overall safety gained by
alerting the driver (in case of model failure) and reducing the
risk of collision. Table 1 shows the safety gained evaluation
result across different SWA ranges. Comparing the image
and saliency map inputs shows saliency maps superiority in
detecting the model failure and increasing driving safety.
SWA Range Unsafe Condition ThresholdSaliency Map Camera Image
(0°-30°) SWA 42% 18%
(30°-60°) SWA 56% 51%
(60°-90°) SWA 68% 68%
Table 1. Safety gained with our failure predictor model across
different SWA ranges. Higher safety gain in higher SWA ranges
could be a result of the main model’s poor performance on those
conditions.
6. Discussion and Future Works
Saliency maps are visualizations of what a model has
learned relevant to each individual input. Although this in-
terpretability method is primarily being used to understand
and debug the machine learning models, we take advantage
of saliency maps to evaluate a model’s safety and failure pre-
diction. Different methods have been proposed to evaluate
(e.g., (Samek et al., 2017) and (Mohseni & Ragan, 2018))
and perform sanity checks (e.g., (Adebayo et al., 2018))
on saliency methods. Different from others, we are aiming
to maintain the safety of the machine learning software by
predicting its reliability through a white-box approach. In
our future work, we plan to compare how different saliency
methods would affect failure prediction performance.
Comparison of our preliminary evaluation results
with (Hecker et al., 2018) suggests saliency maps’ higher
performance in predicting model failure, Table 1. However,
We could not compare our results with the uncertainty-based
failure prediction method proposed in (Michelmore et al.,
2018) due to their very limited training and evaluation
experiment conditions. To better exploit saliency maps in
predicting model reliability, in our future work, we plan to
increase training data size and augment different noises
such as rain and fog for a better evaluation experiment.
Our experiments show evaluation criteria in autonomous
driving algorithms are very diverse, and the use of driving
simulators help to cover more safety measures such as
vehicle deviation from baseline trajectory and collision
prediction.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a design for utilizing saliency
maps to predict model failure in a safety-critical applica-
tion. We compared our method with similar papers in the
autonomous vehicles safety field. Our preliminary experi-
ments and evaluation shows saliency maps out perform raw
images in predicting model failure and are possible candi-
dates to predict model failure in case of adverse conditions.
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